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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
EDWIN PAPSE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

Case No.

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah State
Prison,
Defendant-Respondent

11,111

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

The appellant, Edwin Papse, appeals from an
order of the District Court of Box Elder County denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
By order dated December 1, 1967, accompanied

by Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
Honorable Lewis Jones denied appellant's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent submits that the order of the First
District Court denying appellant's petition for a writ
of habeas corpus should be affirmed.

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 22, 1966, appellant and one George
Jackson were arrested and charged with the crime
of rape. On August 9 the court appointed counsel
for appellant and thereafter defendants were arraigned. At the arra'iqnment, all precautions were
taken to guarantee the constitutional rights of appellant and defense counsel informed him of the
consequences of a guilty plea. Appellant then entered a plea of guilty. The appellant was sentenced
to the Utah State Prison.

In May of 1967, appellant petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus. A hearing was held on the matter
on October 30, 1967, and on December 1, 1967, the ,
petition was denied. Appellant filed a second petition which was denied and appellant appeals from
the denial of both petitions.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT FAILED TO SUSTAIN HIS BURDEN
OF SHOWING THAT HIS GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT
VOLUNTARY WHEN THE RECORD SHOWS COUN·
SEL INFORMED HIM OF THE CONSEQUENCES AND
HIS PREVIOUS FELONY CONVICTION GAVE HIM
NOTICE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A PLEA.

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is
upon the person petitioning for the writ to establish
error prejudicing his rights before the writ will be
granted. In State v. Spiers, 12 Utah 2d 14, 361 P.Zd
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14, 361 P.2d 509 (1961), the court said, "The burden
is upon the defendant to show that he has been
denied his constitutional rights." If the burden of
affirmatively showing error is not met, the trial
court's findings and decision will be upheld. In
Baine v. Beckstead. 10 Utah 2d 4, ll, 347 P.2d 554
(1959), this court stated that, "In attacking it, (the record), the burden was upon the defendants to affirmatively show error, failing which, the action of the
trial court is deemed to be correct." This point was
reiterated recently in Brown v. Turner, ............ Utah
2d ............ , 440 P.2d 986, 969 (1968), a habeas corpus
appeal in which the court said, "If the established
rules of procedure are followed they assure ample
protection of the rights of one who is accused of
crime. After this has been done and a judgment has
been rendered all presumptions favor its validity
and the burden of showing to the contrary is upon
one who attempts to upset it." The Supreme Court
of Washington in Ex parte Tugas. 41 Wash. 2d 33,
246 P.2d 851 (1952) held: "In habeas corpus proceedings . . . the findings of the trial court will not be
disturbed unless the evidence clearly preponderates
against them."

In this case, the respondent contends that appellant has failed to sustain his burden of showing
that his plea of guilty was involuntarily entered.
The trial court went the extra mile to insure and
safeguard appellant's constitutional rights. The record shows the court appointed counsel over appellcmt' s objection (Tr. 80).
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The record further shows that defendant knew
the consequences of his plea; it was mentioned at
trial, at the arraignment, and before the court accepted his plea.

The testimony of appellant's counsel shows that
he made every effort to inform appellant of the seri- i
ousness of the charge and the consequences: " ... so
I tried to explain to them the seriousness of the
charge and the consequences and the possibility
of things." (R. 49) Defendant didn't want a trial. "They
didn't want the trial. in other words, and were quite
adamant to the effect that they wanted to get it over
with and not go through a trial." R. 53) Counsel informed the defendant of the consequences of a
guilty plea (R. 54); the defendant was further ad- '
vised of the consequences of the guilty plea (R. 56).
It has been held that a presumption exists that
the attorney has discharged his duties and " ... this
presumption is not overcome by the uncorroborated
statements of the petitioner in a habeas corpus pro·
ceeding." Dexter v. Crouse, 192 Kan. 151, 386 P.Zd
263, 266 (1963). Here, the record shows the attorney
informed defendant of the consequences of a guilty
plea and he knew what these consequences were.

When one looks at the record and the fact that
defendant was previously convicted of a felony in
Idaho, and served part of a sentence because of a
guilty plea, it is reasonable that appellant knew the
consequences of his plea. It was stated at the ar·
raignment that the sentence was a term in the State
Prison; defense counsel's testimony shows that he
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informed appellant of the consequences of a plea
of guilty; appellant's previous conviction based on
a guilty plea, point to one reasonable conclusion
that appellant knew the consequences of his guilty
plea and that the plea was voluntarily made. Appellant could not prove any coercion and has not sustained his burden of showing clearly that the plea
was not voluntarily made. See Workman v. Turner.
i 9 Utah 2d l, 425 P.2d 402 (1967).
The rationale of the Utah Supreme Court in re1vewing habeas corpus proceedings, as stated by
Mr. Justice Crockett in Brown v. Turner. supra. is
applicable in this case. After stating that the burden
is upon one attempting to upset a conviction to
show his rights were impaired, the court said:
... When such an attempt is made the administration of justice is best served by directing the inquiry to this foundational question: Was substantial
justice done and has guilt been established? While
on the one hand we honor the observance of the
iights of the individua.l in order to protect the innocent, on the other we cannot be oblivious to the
necessity of protecting rights of the public to be
kept safe from crime hy encouraging effective law
enforcement.

POINT II
THE TRIAL ,JUDGE HAS NO DUTY TO INQUIRE

INTO THE VOLUNTARINESS OF A GUILTY PLEA

WHEN DEFENDANT IS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL
ESPECIALLY WHEN IT IS REASONABLE TO BELIEVE
'T'HE PLEA IS VOLUNTARILY MADE.

Utah Law requires an explanation of the con-
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sequences of a plea of guilty when defendant is not
represented by counsel. Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-6
(1953). It is up to the descretion of the trial judge to
refuse to accept a plea. Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-7
(1953). The trial judge, in his discretion, accepted
the plea and where counsel is present, he has no
duty to inform the defendant of the consequences
of such a plea. It is reasonable for a trial judge to
be able to rely on defense counsel adequately protecting the interests of his client and relating to them
the consequences of their desired action. It is hard
to imagine any difference in the outcome if the
judge had specifically stated the possible sentence
to appellant. Everything was done by counsel to ,
inform them of the consequences of the plea, the ·
seriousness of the charge and advisability of a trial.
The record shows the judge mentioned the effect of
guilty plea would be a prison term. (Tr. 81, 82) If
after all that was done to clarify to defendant the
consequences of what he was doing, and defendant was confused, although it is hard to imagine
how he was still confosed; rsee argument, point I J,
then nothing could have been done to erase this
purported confusion. The argument of appellant's
confusion is based on appellant's uncorroborated
testimony and standing alone is not enough to overcome the presumption of his attorney performing
his duties. See Dexter v. Crouse, supra.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's plea was voluntarily made and the
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record shows that the consequences of his plea
were explained to him. Every effort was made to
insure his constitutional rights, counsel informed
him on the consequences, and he had previously
served time in the Idaho State Penitentiary based on
a guilty plea. All these facts lead to a reasonable
conclusion that defendant's plea was voluntary and
informed when made. Appellant failed to sustain his
burden of showing that the plea was involuntary
and uninformed based on the record and the evidence.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
GERALD G. GUNDRY
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent

